External reference pricing imposes a price cap for drugs based on prices in other countries. This paper studies the design of external reference pricing schemes, i.e., the choice of reference countries and pricing rules, in a three-country-framework. Given that the manufacturer sells to all three countries, the minimum price-rule yields the lowest drug price. As external reference pricing may increase the drug price in the reference country, it creates the incentive for the reference countries to also adopt external reference pricing. Thus external reference pricing results in regulatory convergence and a uniform price among all countries, i.e., price convergence. If the referencing country is su¢ciently large, the manufacturer may not export to reference countries under the minimum price-rule. Then the average price-rule may safeguard exports to reference countries and generate a lower drug price in the referencing country.
all European countries apply external reference pricing 1 , with schemes varying in the number of reference countries and pricing rules. For instance, Portugal refers to prices in 3 other countries, while Italy uses 27 reference countries 2 external reference pricing. They …nd no incentive to delay the launch when the countries only refer to the prices of a subset of all countries in a transitive way and any period. Persson & Jönsson (2015) argue that applying external reference pricing is attractive but costly, as it induces manufacturers to limit or delay launches and reduces opportunities for price discrimination among countries.
While the e¤ect of reference pricing on launch delays has gained considerable attention in the literature, the choice of the design of external reference pricing schemes with respect to the number of reference price countries and the pricing rule has not been studied extensively so far. Moreover, the e¤ect of one country adopting a speci…c scheme on the respective choices of other countries has not received much attention in the literature. Since reference pricing makes drug prices interdependent, it may also make di¤erent reference pricing regimes interdependent: One country applying external reference pricing may incentivize other countries to follow. Therefore external reference pricing may not only create price convergence but regulatory convergence as well.
Against this background, this paper explores the design of external reference pricing schemes in a three-country-framework. This framework allows analyzing di¤erent sets of reference countries and pricing rules. Also, it makes it possible to study the e¤ect of reference pricing on third countries, especially their incentive also to introduce external reference pricing. This paper analyzes the choice of external reference pricing schemes in one country as well as its e¤ect on welfare in the other countries, the manufacturer's export decision, and the incentives for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme.
Given that the manufacturer sells to all three countries, the minimum price-rule yields the lowest drug price. As external reference pricing may increase the drug price in the reference country, it creates the incentive for the reference countries to also adopt external reference pricing. Thus external reference pricing results in regulatory convergence and a uniform price among all countries, i.e., price convergence. If the referencing country is su¢ciently large, the manufacturer may not export to reference countries under the minimum price-rule. Then the average price-rule may safeguard exports to reference countries and generates a lower drug price in the referencing country.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the model is presented. Section 3 studies the regulatory scenarios. Section 4 analyzes the choice of regulatory schemes in one country; section 5 studies its e¤ect on welfare in the other countries. Section 6 studies the incentives for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme. Section 7 analyzes the choice of external reference pricing schemes on the manufacturer's export decision. Section 8 concludes.
The Model
Consider an innovative …rm selling a drug in three countries, j = A; B; C. Assume that the …rm is located in a fourth country.
In all three countries, third-party payers cover drug costs partially. Consider that consumers pay a fraction j , j 2 (0; 1), of the drug price out-of-pocket (coinsurance). This is, drug copayment and thus the e¤ective price for consumers is c j = j p j . Thirdparty payers reimburse a fraction 1 j p j of the drug price. Reimbursement and the role of third-party payers in …nancing the drug create the incentive for regulation to decrease public cost.
Each consumer demands either one or zero units of the drug. The utility derived from no drug consumption is zero. A consumer i in country j who buys one unit of the drug obtains a net utility of
where ij is a preference parameter, j is the coinsurance rate, and p j is the drug price in country j.
Consumers di¤er in the preference parameter , which may be interpreted as willingness to pay. Heterogeneity among consumers may stem from di¤erences in the severity of the condition, prescription practices or insurance coverage (see e.g., Brekke, Holmas & Straume, 2011). Assume that the parameter is uniformly distributed over the in-
The parameter j can be interpreted as the maximum willingness to pay for a given price, in the following referred to as market size. The total mass of consumers in all countries is one.
The marginal consumer in country j who is indi¤erent between buying the drug or not has a gross valuation b j = j p j . Hence, demand in country j is given as q N = 1 j p j . In this set-up, there are two di¤erences between countries: First, countries di¤er in maximum willingness to pay for a given price. Second, countries di¤er in demand elasticity (due to di¤erences in coinsurance rates). Di¤erences in j and/or j generate di¤erences in drug prices, providing the incentive for governments to implement price caps based on the price in another country (external reference pricing).
Consider the following timing: In stage 1, the regulatory agency in country A chooses the external reference pricing scheme to minimize the drug price. In stage 2, the …rm sets prices.
Regulatory Scenarios

Coinsurance
Consider …rst the case of coinsurance where the manufacturer may set the price freely in all countries. Variables under coinsurance are denoted by an asterisk.
The manufacturer sets country-speci…c prices p j to maximize its pro…t
The equilibrium price p j in country j is
The price p j in country j increases in market size j and decreases in the coinsurance rate j . Thus, price di¤erences between countries are driven by di¤erences in market size j and coinsurance rates j .
The manufacturer's pro…t from selling in country j is
External Reference Pricing
Consider now the case where the government in country A adopts external reference pricing. The following external reference pricing schemes are studied:
-One reference country (B), denoted as 1B. This imposes a price cap P 1B A = p B .
-One reference country (C), denoted as 1C. This imposes a price cap P 1C A = p C .
-Two reference countries, denoted as 2minj. This imposes a price cap
-Two reference countries, denoted as 2avg. This imposes a price cap
One Reference Country
Consider …rst that the government in country A sets a price cap based on the price in one country. For instance, Luxemburg only refers to the manufacturer's home country (Toumi et al., 2013) . Two cases are possible; the price cap can be based on the drug price in country B (scheme 1B) or the drug price in country C (scheme 1C). The choice between the two reference countries is considered exogenous at this point.
Under scheme 1B, the manufacturer sets prices to maximize
Equilibrium prices are
The manufacturer's pro…t is
The imposed price cap P 1B A is binding, i.e., p 1B
Equilibrium existence requires that the manufacturer has no incentive to deviate from the proposed prices. A deviation to g
would allow it to avoid the price cap based on the price in country B. However, this is not pro…table, i.e.,
> 0, see Appendix A.1. Under scheme 1C, the manufacturer sets prices to maximize
The The manufacturer sets prices to maximize
Based on di¤erences in market size and coinsurance rates, three price vectors p
; p 2minj C g, are equilibrium outcomes.
In two equilibria, the manufacturer is constrained in setting the price for country A and a second country, but may set the price freely in the third country: In equilibrium 2minB, the price cap in A is based on the price in country B, which is lower than the (unconstrained) price in country C. In equilibrium 2minC, the price cap in A is based on the price in country C, which is lower than the (unconstrained) price in country B.
In equilibrium 2minBC, the manufacturer is constrained in price setting in all three countries and sets a uniform price.
In equilibrium 2minB, equilibrium prices are
The imposed price cap P 2minB A is binding, i.e., p 2minB
In equilibrium 2minC, equilibrium prices are
The imposed price cap P 2minC A is binding, i.e., p 2minC
In equilibrium 2minBC, the (uniform) equilibrium price is
The imposed price cap P 2minBC A is binding, i.e., p 2minBC
Under this rule, di¤erences in market size and coinsurance rates determine whether the price cap is based on the price in one country, allowing the price in the third country to be set freely (2minB or 2minC) or whether this rule constrains price setting in all three countries and the manufacturer sets a uniform price (2minBC). Whether the minimum rule imposes a constraint on the prices in country A and one reference country as for 2minB or 2minC or whether it imposes a constraint on prices in all three countries depends on the deviations from the pro…t maximizing price in country A and the reference country (the country with the lower of both prices). When setting prices under the minimum price-rule, the manufacturer balances the loss in pro…t from a lower price in country A against the loss in pro…t from a lower price in the reference country.
As the change in pro…t due to a deviation + or from the pro…t-maximizing price (the price under coinsurance) increases exponentially in 3 , it is not optimal to adjust the price in only one country, leaving the price in the other country unchanged. Instead, the manufacturer minimizes losses in pro…ts across countries by reducing the price in 3 The change in pro…t due to a price (p ) is
country A and increasing it in the reference country. If the manufacturer is constrained in price setting in all three countries, it changes the price in both reference countries as well. This implies that the minimum rule changes the drug price not only in country A but also in at least one of the other countries. As the change in pro…t from price changes depends on the market size and the coinsurance rate in the respective country and the manufacturer balances losses in pro…t across all markets, price changes in all countries a¤ected depend on market sizes and coinsurance rates in all countries.
If countries B and C are rather di¤erent concerning market size, so are the pro…t-maximizing prices under coinsurance when price setting is free. A price cap based on the lower of both prices and the corresponding deviations from the pro…t-maximizing price in A and the reference country are small relative to the price in the third country. Then the price cap in A is based on the lower of both prices (price of the smaller country), and the manufacturer may set the price freely in the third country (the larger country).
This is, the equilibrium outcome is 2minB or 2minC, depending on which country is smaller and yields the lower price.
, the price cap is based on the price in country B and the price in country C is the same as under coinsurance. For
, the price cap is based on the price in country C and the price in country B is the same as under coinsurance.
If countries B and C are rather similar in market size, two cases can be distinguished:
If the market size in country A is rather small relative to the market size in B and C,
i.e., all three countries are rather similar, the deviations from the pro…t maximizing price in the reference country are small and do not a¤ect the price in the third country. Then the manufacturer may set the price freely in one country (the larger country) and the price cap in A is based on the lower of the prices in countries B and C (price of the smaller country). This is, the equilibrium outcome is 2minB or 2minC. If the market size in country A is rather large relative to the market size in B and C, the deviations from the pro…t maximizing price in country A and the reference country are too large to not a¤ect the price for the third country. In this case, the minimum rule constrains the manufacturer in all three countries. A failure to take the constraint in the third country into account would create an inconsistent price ranking. The equilibrium outcome is
2minBC:
This is, depending on market size, three equilibrium outcomes are possible under the minimum price-rule:
, the equilibrium outcome is 2minB.
, the equilibrium outcome is 2minBC. 
Two Reference Countries, Average Price
Consider now that the regulatory agency in country A sets a price cap based on the average price in countries B and C (scheme 2avg).
For example, in Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands, the average price-rule is applied (Toumi et al., 2013).
The manufacturer sets prices to maximize
The imposed price cap P 2avg A is binding, i.e., p
Equilibrium existence requires that the manufacturer has no incentive to deviate from the proposed prices. Under the average price-rule, a deviation to ] p
would allow it to avoid the price cap. However, this is not
Choice of Regulatory Scheme
Consider now the choice of the regulatory schemes by the regulatory agency with the aim to minimize the drug price. Welfare in country A, given as pro…t in country A plus consumer surplus less third party payer expenditure (W A = A + CS A E A ), decreases in the drug price 4 . Minimizing the drug price is thus equivalent to maximizing welfare.
External reference pricing lowers the drug price compared to coinsurance if market size in country A (relative to the coinsurance rate) is su¢ciently large and the price cap imposed by external reference pricing is binding.
Choosing only one reference country, i.e., scheme 1B or 1C, is not optimal as the government in country A foregoes using information on a lower price and accordingly the possibility of choosing a lower price cap. Schemes 1B and 1C yield the same drug price as schemes 2minB and 2minC, but for the parameter set where the minimum rule generates a uniform price across all three countries, schemes 1B and 1C yield a higher drug price than the minimum rule. The minimum price-rule allows the regulator to exert a stronger restriction on the manufacturer's price setting and to enforce a uniform price.
Consider in the following that the government in country A chooses two reference countries. If country B and C are su¢ciently di¤erent, the minimum price-rule generates a lower price than the average price-rule, as using the higher of both prices at all does not make sense. Moreover, the link between prices in country A and the country with the lower price is stronger under the minimum price-rule: Whereas under the average price-rule price changes in the reference countries are transmitted to country A only by one 50% each, the minimum price-rule enforces a direct one-to-one link between prices in the reference country and the referencing country A.
If country B and C are rather similar and the market size in country A is rather small relative to the market size in B and C, i.e., all three countries are rather similar, the minimum price-rule yields a lower price as the manufacturer makes higher price concessions in the reference country and country A in order to keep the price in the third country free. The average price-rule, on the contrary, imposes restrictions on the manufacturer's price setting in all three countries. If the market size in country A is rather large relative to the market size in B and C, both the minimum price-rule and the average price-rule impose restrictions on the manufacturer's price setting in all three countries. In this case, the minimum price-rule yields a lower price as it enforces a direct one-to-one link between prices in all countries.
Proposition 1 summarizes the choice of regulatory schemes in country A:
The government in country A chooses two reference countries and the minimum price-rule to minimize the drug price.
E¤ect on Drug Prices in Reference Countries
This section studies the e¤ect of external reference pricing in country A on drug prices and welfare in countries B and C.
Welfare in country B and C is given as
As welfare decreases in the price, higher prices decrease welfare.
Country A implements the minimum price-rule to minimize the drug price in country A. If the equilibrium outcome is 2minB, this increases the drug price in country B compared to coinsurance while leaving the drug price in country C unchanged, i.e.,
Similarly, under 2minC, the drug price in country C is higher than under coinsurance while the drug price in country B is not a¤ected, i.e.,
Also, under 2minBC, drug prices in countries B and C are higher than under coinsurance.
Proposition 2 summarizes the e¤ect of the choice of regulatory scheme in country A on drug prices in countries B and C:
Proposition 2 If country A adopts the minimum price-rule, drug prices in countries B and Care higher than under free pricing in country A.
Mutual Referencing
Consider now cases where also countries B and C may adopt external reference pricing schemes. In countries B and C, the increase in drug prices under external reference pricing in country A may create the incentive to apply also an external reference pricing scheme.
One Reference Country
If countries use one reference country, six cases are possible.
i) Single referencing: One country, e.g., A references to one country, e.g., B, the other two countries (B, C) do not apply external reference pricing.
ii) Mutual referencing: One country, e.g., A references to one country, e.g., B, which references back to A. Country C does not apply external reference pricing.
iii) Circular referencing: One country, e.g., A, references to one country, e.g., B, which references to C, which references to country A:
iv) Incomplete circular referencing: One country, e.g., A, references to one country, e.g., B, which references to C . Country C does not apply external reference pricing.
v) Mutual referencing and referencing from the third country: One country, e.g., A references to one country, e.g., B, which references back to A. Country C also references to country B.
vi) Joint referencing: One country, e.g., A references to one country, e.g., B. Country C also references to country B. Country B does not apply external reference pricing. While cases i) and ii) are equivalent to the case in 3.2.1, cases iii) to vi) result in the manufacturer setting a uniform price p in all three countries. In this case, the manufacturer sets a uniform price p = But if A refers to the price in B, there is an incentive for C to also refer to the price in A or B, as it lowers the price in C, i.e., p < p 1B C for A < \
if A refers to the price in C, there is an incentive for B to also refer to the price in A or C to lower the price, i.e., p < p
Two Reference Countries, Minimum Price
If countries use two reference countries and the minimum price-rule, three cases are possible.
i) Only one country, e.g., A, adopts the minimum price-rule and references to the prices in countries B and C.
ii) Two countries, e.g., A and B adopt the minimum price-rule and reference to the prices in countries B and C, A and C, respectively.
iii) All countries adopt the minimum price-rule.
Case i) and ii) are equivalent to the case in 3.2.2, case iii) results in a uniform price p in all three countries. If A adopts the minimum price-rule, there is no incentive for the country with the lower price (B or C) to also adopt the minimum price-rule, as the outcome in case i) and ii) is the same. But for the third country, e.g.,
, there is an incentive to also adopt the minimum price-rule, as it results in a lower drug price (p < p 2minB
).
Two Reference Countries, Average Price
If countries use two reference countries and the average price-rule, three cases are possible.
i) Only country one country, e.g., A adopts the average price-rule and references to the prices in countries B and C.
ii) Two countries, e.g., A and B, adopt the average price-rule and reference to the prices in countries B and C, A and C, respectively.
iii) All countries adopt the average price-rule.
Case i) is equivalent to the case in 3.2.2, cases ii) and iii) result in a uniform price p in all three countries.
If country A adopts the average price-rule, there is an incentive to also adopt the average price rule for the country with the larger market size and accordingly, the higher drug price, as it results in a lower drug price, i.e., p < p
Independent of the external reference pricing scheme chosen by A, there is an incentive for the third country or the country with the higher price also to adopt an external reference pricing scheme. In all cases the outcome is a uniform price, implying price convergence across all countries.
If country A adopts the minimum price-rule, a switch to uniform pricing increases the drug price in A, i.e., p > p 2minB
. This is, regulatory convergence does not generate downward price convergence. If country A adopted the average price-rule, a switch to uniform pricing would decrease the drug price in A, i.e., p < p 2avg A . Proposition 3 summarizes the incentive for the other countries to also adopt an external reference pricing scheme: Proposition 3 If country A adopts an external reference pricing scheme, there is an incentive for the third country or country with the higher drug price to also adopt external reference pricing. If all countries adopt an external reference pricing scheme, the manufacturer sets a uniform drug price for all three countries.
If country A applies any external reference scheme, the other countries also have an incentive to apply an external reference pricing scheme. The likely outcome is a uniform price in all three countries.
Compared to the scenario with coinsurance, a uniform price increases the welfare in country A if the market size in country A is su¢ciently large, i.e.,
, that is, country A may apply an external reference pricing scheme which is binding, but due to the incentive for other countries to apply external reference pricing schemes as well, welfare (and consequently the drug price) in country A is lower than under no regulation.
In country B, the uniform price increases welfare if the market size in country A is su¢ciently small or if the market size in country B is su¢ciently large, i.e., W B =
In both cases, the uniform price is lower than the price under coinsurance. A su¢ciently small market size in country A decreases the uniform price (which increases in the market size of country A), a su¢ciently large market size in country B increases the price under coinsurance by more than the uniform price. In country C, the uniform price increases welfare if the market size in country A is su¢ciently small or if the market size in country B (relative to the market size in country C) is su¢ciently small, i.e.,
In both cases, the uniform price is lower than the price under coinsurance. Both a su¢ciently small market size in country A and a su¢ciently small market size in country B decrease the uniform price (which increases in the market size of country A and market size of country B).
For all three countries, these e¤ects o¤set each other and global welfare increases i.e.,
Proposition 4 summarizes the welfare e¤ect of uniform pricing.
Proposition 4
If other countries also apply external reference pricing and a uniform price is the outcome, global welfare increases.
Endogenous Export Decision
Consider now that the …rm may adjust its export decision to the choice of regulatory schemes in country A. In particular, it may refrain from exporting to one of the countries, if a low price may spill over to a high price country. Consider in the following that country
A applies the minimum price-rule, as it generates the lowest drug price. Export decisions under all external reference pricing schemes can be found in Appendix A.5.
If the government in country A applies the minimum price-rule and 2minB is the equilibrium outcome, the price cap in country A is based on the price in country B, which is lower than the price in country C. If the manufacturer decides not to export to B (and the price cap is based on the price in country C instead), it can avoid the low price cap at the cost of foregoing pro…ts from selling in country B and not being able to set the price in country C freely. Moreover, the resulting price cap based on the price in country C is less restrictive. The manufacturer does not export to country B if the pro…t from selling to country A and C under the scheme 1C is higher than the pro…t from selling to all three countries under the scheme 2minB, i.e., B and identical coinsurance rates in all three countries when the export decision is endogenous. If the market size in country A is su¢ciently large and the market in B is su¢ciently small, the …rm may refrain from exporting to B. As a result, the minimum price-rule turns into the rule 1C. Similarly, if the market sizes in countries A and B are large, the …rm refrains from supplying country C under the minimum price-rule, so that the resulting reference price rule is 1B instead. In both cases, 1B and 1C result in a higher price than the equilibrium outcomes 2minB and 2minC would have. If the government in country A applied the average price-rule instead, the manufacturer would not export to country B and accept a price cap based on the price in country
and B <^ B avg;1C = 
< p 1C
A and p 2avg A < p 1B A , the government in A could achieve a lower price by the average price-rule than by the minimum price-rule if it takes the export decision of the manufacturer into account, as illustrated in Figure 3 . 
Conclusion
This paper has studied the design of external reference pricing schemes, in particular, the choice of reference countries and pricing rules, in a three-country-framework. Given that the manufacturer sells to all three countries, referencing to two countries and adopting minimum price-rule generates the lowest drug price. Since external reference pricing lowers drug prices, it increases welfare in referencing countries.
At the same time, it increases drug prices in the reference countries, creating the incentive for other countries to also adopt external reference pricing. Thus, external ref-
erence pricing results in regulatory convergence and a uniform price among all countries, i.e., price convergence. External reference pricing by other countries does not generate downward price convergence, as it increases the price in country A.
If the market size in the country that applies reference pricing is su¢ciently large, external reference pricing may prevent the manufacturer to supply the reference countries. Therefore, external reference pricing may induce substantial distortions in drug availability in third countries. Then the average price-rule may safeguard exports to reference countries and generate a lower drug price in the referencing country.
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Appendix
A.1 Regulatory Scenarios
External Reference Pricing Scheme 1B
Equilibrium existence: Consider the pricing strategy g
", which allows the manufacturer to avoid the price cap P 1B
A . The manufacturer's pro…t is maximized for
. The pro…t for this pricing strat-
External Reference Pricing Scheme 1C
", which allows the manufacturer to avoid the price cap P 1C
A . The manufacturer's pro…t is maximized for g
. The pro…t for this pric-
, with
External Reference Pricing Scheme 2min
Binding price cap P 2minB
Binding price cap P 2minC
Binding price cap P 2minBC
, with . The pro…t for this pricing strategy is p2minB
Equilibrium existence 2minC: Consider the pricing strategyp 2minC A =p 2minC C ", which allows the manufacturer to avoid the price cap P 2minC A . The manufacturer's pro…t is maximized forp 2minC
. The pro…t for this pricing strategy is p2minC
, with 2minC p 2minC
Equilibrium existence 2minBC: Consider the pricing strategyp 2minBC 
External Reference Pricing Scheme 2avg 
A.2 Choice of Regulatory Scheme
Minimum price rule vs. average price rule, 2minB:
Minimum price rule vs. average price rule, 2minC:
: Minimum price rule vs. average price rule, 2minBC:
A.3 Welfare in Reference Countries
Global welfare under coinsurance: W = Global welfare under uniform price:
A.4 Mutual Referencing
One reference country:
Two reference countries, minimum price:
Two reference countries, average price:
A.5 Endogenous Export Decision
One Reference Country 1B vs. no exports to B and coinsurance in A and C:
1B vs. no exports to B and 1C: 
